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I.

INTRODUCTION

In suits arising out of construction disputes plaintiffs may
assert claims for unfair and deceptive trade practices with an
eye toward collecting attorneys' fees and increasing leverage during settlement negotiations. Defendants subsequently defend the
claim or pursue the costly process of attempting to have such
claims dismissed on motions for summary judgment. This article
will provide guidance for determining whether or not facts in a
particular construction dispute support a claim for an unfair or
deceptive trade practice. The analysis will focus on disputes
arising out of commercial, institutional, and industrial construction and on situations involving: (1) subcontractor versus general
contractor or construction manager and (2) general contractor or
homeowners' association versus owner-developer.
The legal theory of a lawsuit arising in a construction dispute typically is either breach of contract or breach of the implied warranty of habitability. In some situations, however, the
theory will sound in tort, such as when there is no contract between the prime contractor and the construction manager who is
providing services as the owner's agent. As a part of a breach of
contract claim, the contractor usually alleges both that the work
was performed in accordance with the drawings and specifications and that payment is due. The owner or developer usually
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responds by claiming that the work infact was not performed in
accordance with drawings and specifications and that, therefore,
payment is not due. In some situations, no dispute arises over
whether the owner owes retainage upon final payment, however.
The contractor, however, might claim damages for delay or acceleration. In response, owners facing such claims may refuse to
pay retainage at final payment unless the contractor releases its
claim. The homeowners' association may be faced with a condominium whose roof leaks, whose foundation is cracking, and
whose parking lot is sliding down a mountain. All of these situations may spawn thoughts of overpowering the opposition with
demands for treble damages and attorneys' fees.
This article examines case law interpreting the North Carolina and South Carolina unfair trade practices statutes for common elements in the courts' reasoning. Also, since construction
disputes frequently are resolved through arbitration, the article
will examine the arbitrator's right to award treble damages and
attorney's fees under the "all disputes" clause contained in
many standard form construction agreements.
II.

THE STATUTORY PREDICATE FOR UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE
CLAIMS IN CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION

Rights and remedies arising out of unfair or deceptive trade
practices are not based upon common-law precedents and exist
only as provided in statutes. These creatures of statutes are sui
generis, apparently sounding in tort but neither wholly tortious
nor wholly contractual in nature.'
The starting point in any study of this developing area of
the law is the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).
The key language and core concepts of "unfairness," "deception," and methods of "competition" and their relationships
with "commerce" or "business" are found in title 15, section
45(a)(1) of the United States Code as follows: "Unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared
1. See Bernard v. Central Carolina Truck Sales, 68 N.C. App. 228, 230, 314 S.E.2d
582, 584 (1984) (quoting Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 704, 322 N.E.2d
768, 779 (1975)).
2. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
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unlawful."'
The North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (NCUTPA)
uses identical language." The South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA)5 uses slightly different language, but retains essentially the same meaning: "(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."' North
Carolina courts have followed federal precedents in the application of state law to causes of action under the NCUTPA. 7 The
South Carolina legislature specifically mandated the same result
by expressing in the SCUTPA that the courts be "guided" by
interpretations of the federal act in construing state law.
The FTCA does not create a private right of action for individual litigants for acts declared unlawful under section 45(a).8
The federal courts, however, will protect an individual's rights
and enforce appropriate remedies under state laws if they have
diversity jurisdiction. The FTC encourages state adoption of legislation similar to the UTPA, which are commonly called "Little
FTC Acts" since they are identical to section 5 of the FTC Act,
because it does not have available resources to police unfair acts
or practices." These state acts compliment the FTCA for consumer protection in construction contract disputes. State acts
provide private causes of action for abusive commercial practices
at the local level, referring to the federal act for guidance."0
Both SCUTPA and NCUTPA allow private rights of action
with the possibility of treble damages11 and attorneys' fees.' 2

3. 15 U.S.CA § 45(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1988).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976). For an excellent analysis
of SCUTPA, see Day, The South Carolina Unfair Trade PracticesAct: Sleeping Giant
or Illusive Panacea?,33 S.C.L. REv. 479 (1982); see also Norton, The South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act and the Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine, 40 S.C.L. REV. 641
'(1989).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. See Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985); Johnson v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 266 S.E.2d 610 (1980).
8. See Fulton v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. See Day, supra note 5, at 509.
10. See Norton, supra note 5, at 641.
11. The South Carolina Code provides:
Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property ... as a
result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive
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Both statutes have sections excepting and prohibiting specified
acts13 and, like the FTCA, establish consumer protection
14
schemes within the authority of their attorneys general.
Civil litigation seems to be cyclic. The tidal wave of RICO15
litigation is one example. Similarly, plaintiff's attorneys have
discovered that claims in construction litigation based on unfair
and deceptive trade practices offer a new and useful approach,
with a possible bonus of attorneys' fees.
In some situations within the construction industry, the elements necessary to establish violations of SCUTPA and
NCUTPA are satisfied by proof of deception, unfair and dishon-16
est business conduct, and fraudulent construction practices.
method, act or practice ... may bring an action individually, . . . to recover
actual damages. If the court finds that the use or employment of the unfair or
deceptive method, act or practice was a willful or knowing violation ... the
court shall award three times the actual damages sustained ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (emphasis added).
The North Carolina Code provides:
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation.., destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other
person, firm or corporation in violation. . . of this Chapter, such person, firm
or corporation so injured shall have a right of action [for] .. .such injury
done, and if damages are assessed ...judgment shall be rendered ...for
treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75.16 (1988) (emphasis added).
Note that SCUTPA allows treble damages only for a "willful or knowing" violation,
but NCUTPA automatically allows any damages assessed to be tripled.
12. Section 39-5-140(a) of the South Carolina Code allows the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees for any individual who prevails in his SCUTPA private cause of action. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976). In North Carolina the trial
judge awards attorneys' fees, at his discretion, "upon a finding ...that the party
charged ... willfully engaged in the [unfair] act or [deceptive] practice, and ...
refus[ed] . . .to fully resolve the matter." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75.16.1 (1988). Also, the
defendant may receive attorneys' fees if the plaintiff "knew, or should have known, the
action was frivolous and malicious." See id.
13. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75.1.1(a), (c); -.5(b); -.30 (1988) (respectively dealing with general unfair and deceptive practices, specific exemptions, sale and business
activities, and automatic phone solicitation machines); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-20, -30, 35, -40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (respectively dealing with general unfair and deceptive practices, pyramid clubs, certain insurance coverage, and specific exemptions).
14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-13 to -15 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-60 to -80
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. 1988) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-1.1(b) (1988) defines "commerce" to include "all business
activities, however denominated." SCUTPA makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition" and unfair or deceptive practices in any trade or commerce." (Emphasis added.)
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For example, if a dishonest contractor deceives and defrauds a
first-time home builder as a result of unfair practices, the home
builder, who is essentially a consumer, rightfully has an unfair
trade practice cause of action and the protection of the attorney
general's consumer affairs staff."7
At the other end of the spectrum, however, suppose a power
company and a major construction company contract to build a
multimillion dollar power plant, and the project ends in a dispute in which "unfairness" is alleged in a breach of contract action. Should the power company obtain treble damages under
the state unfair trade practices act? Within commercial contents, the concept of "unfairness" is difficult to grasp. As Judge
Haynsworth wrote in 1981: "In a sense, unfairness inheres in
every breach of contract when one of the contracting parties is
denied the advantage for which he contracted, but this is why
remedial damages are awarded on contract claims."' 18 Formulating precise definitions of acts or practices that are declared unlawful in the UTPA statutes is impossible. Courts must look to
the facts in each transaction and their impact upon the
marketplace.
III.

NORTH AND SOUTH CAROLINA CASE LAW

Courts have decided only a handful of cases involving construction-related disputes that include a claim for unfair trade
practices under SCUTPA or NCUTPA. Of those cases, very few
discuss the merits of the claim, and none are truly borderline
cases. Of course, each time a court broaches these issues, it gives
some clue as to the position the court will take in closer factual
situations. Whether a trade or practice is unfair or deceptive depends on the facts of each case and the impact the practice has
on the market. 19 Following its model, section 5(a)(1) of the

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); see also Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary
Bros. Realty, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 51, 338 S.E.2d 918, cert. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342
S.E.2d 896 (1986); Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d 801
(1978); Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc., 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1984).
17. Cf. Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985) (a purpose of unfair trade practice laws is to protect the consuming public).
18. United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.
1981).
19. See Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7

[Vol. 40

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

FTCA, courts have interpreted SCUTPA to require that a deceptive practice have "the capacity or effect or tendency to
deceive. ' 20 Actual intent to deceive, however, is not a prerequisite. 2 1 The following cases explain the application of the

SCUTPA to construction disputes:
(1) Subdivision lot sales agents and the developer as a principal violated SCUTPA when the agents told prospective buyers
whatever they felt the buyers wished to hear,

'2 2

including illu-

sory promises to pave roads, add street lights, and access city
water.23 The court held that the misrepresentations, which were
made by the agent and the developer as a principal, were unfair
24
and deceptive practices.
(2) An experienced contractor violated SCUTPA by fraudulently inducing inexperienced homeowners into entering a contract for repairs and into giving the contractor a promissory note
and a mortgage on their home. The court held that the contractor, as well as the assignee of the note and mortgage, were liable
under SCUTPA. 5
(3) The contractor and suppliers of fiberglass glazing material for a greenhouse did not violate SCUTPA by misrepresenting the extent of the material's warranty. The court held that
the misrepresentation constituted a breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, but was not an unfair trade practice 21 .
Other cases mentioned claims of unfair trade practice, but did
not analyze the merits of the claim in any detail.27 Thus, there
are few tested fact situations under SCUTPA.
North Carolina courts apply a factor analysis to determine
whether a claim for unfair trade practices is sufficient. First,
there must be a practice, act, or representation that falls within

20. State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 525, 313 S.E.2d 334, 338 (Ct.

App. 1984).
21. See id.at 524, 313 S.E.2d at 337.

22. See id. at 523-25, 535, 313 S.E.2d at 336-38, 342.
23. Id. at 523, 313 S.E.2d at 337.
24. See id. at 523-24, 313 S.E.2d at 337-38.
25. See Rosemond v. Campbell, 288 S.C. 516, 343 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1986).
26. See Hines v. IBG Int'l, Inc., 813 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1987).
27. See, e.g., Dockside Ass'n v. Detyens, Simmons and Carlisle, 285 S.C. 565, 330
S.E,2d 537 (Ct. App. 1985); Reid v. Harbison Dev. Corp., 285 S.C. 557, 330 S.E.2d 532
(Ct. App. 1985); Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc., 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E.2d 179 (Ct. App.
1984).
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the definition of "unfair."28 The courts generally have described
a practice as unfair "when it offends established public policy as
well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers."2 Second,
North Carolina requires that the acts or practices have an impact on the marketplace. Usually an act has an impact on the
marketplace either when it was part of a larger pattern or when
the act was so strongly against public policy that a court's failure to redress the behavior would threaten consumers in general.30 Third, North Carolina courts require that the acts or
practices have an "adverse impact on the individual or entity
deceived" in the form of actual damages. 31
Considering these three factors, North Carolina courts have
found a violation of NCUTPA in the following situations:
(1) when a builder constructed a house on land filled with
vegetable material including tress, pine needles, and pine
cones; 3
(2) when an aluminum siding contractor made a cancellable
contract with a homeowner, but then would not provide the
forms with which to cancel;3" and
(3) when a homeowner routinely secured services and
materials from small subcontractors with no intention of paying
them.3 4
North Carolina courts have found the following circumstances were not violative of NCUTPA:
(1) when an architect agreed to design a house that would
cost $35,000 and to follow certain specifications, but submitted
plans for houses of lesser quality costing $40,000 and $47,000;" 5
(2) when a developer failed to fix a home purchaser's water

28. See Jennings Glass Co. v. Brummer, 88 N.C. App. 44, 362 S.E.2d 578 (1987).
29. Id. at 52, 362 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300
N.C. 247, 263, 263 S.E.2d 610, 621 (1980)).
30. See Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 N.C. 247, 263 S.E.2d 610
(1980).
31. See
32. See
(1978).
33. See
22 (1984).
34. See
35. See

Miller v. Ensley, 88 N.C. App. 686, 691, 365 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1988).
Stone v. Paradise Park Homes, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 97, 245 S.E.2d 801
Eastern Roofing & Aluminum Co. v. Brock, 70 N.C. App. 431, 320 S.E.2d
Jennings Glass Co. v. Brummer, 88 N.C. App. 44, 362 S.E.2d 578 (1987).
Hammers v. Lowe's Co., 48 N.C. App. 150, 268 S.E.2d 257 (1980).
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drainage problem that clearly was covered by warranty; 6
(3) when roofing materials used on a tobacco warehouse
failed and clearly were covered by the supplier's warranty; 7
(4) when a contractor requested early progress payments to
repair equipment for constructing a pond and then stopped
work after receiving the payment;"
(5) when a retired couple, in reliance on developer's assurance that the lot they intended to purchase would be served
with water, sewer, paved roads, and would be ready for construction of their retirement home, moved to North Carolina and expended all of their savings;3 9
(6) when a contractor was induced to enter a contract with a
person representing himself as the owner, who was, in fact, the
previous owner who had transferred the property to his daughter; 40 and
(7) when a contractor stated that the use of beetle-infested
beams would cause the owner no problems other than "a little
'4 1
bit of sawdust.
These North Carolina cases indicate that a mere breach of warranty or contract is insufficient to establish a claim for an unfair
trade practice.42 The alleged "unfair" practice must be repeated
43
or be very strongly against public policy.
The North Carolina position is in accord with the prevailing
view across the country.44 Gross v. Idea Pool Corp.45 explains the
reasoning. In Gross the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that the
Fair Business Practices Act,46 also modeled on the FTCA, does
not make every breach of contract a violation. A breach of contract will constitute a violation only if a deceptive act or practice
36. See Coble v. Richardson Corp., 71 N.C. App. 511, 322 S.E.2d 817 (1984).
37. See Warren v. Guttanit, Inc., 69 N.C. App. 103, 317 S.E.2d 5 (1984).
38. See Goodrich v. Rice, 75 N.C. App. 530, 331 S.E.2d 195 (1985).
39. See Opsahl v. Pinehurst, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 56, 344 S.E.2d 68 (1986).
40. See Miller v. Ensley, 88 N.C. App. 686, 365 S.E.2d 11 (1988).
41. See Warfield v. Hicks, 91 N.C. App. 1, 370 S.E.2d 689 (1988).
42. Also, in South Carolina a mere breach of contract is not a SCUTPA violation.
See Key Co. v. Fameco Distrib., 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E.2d 476 (Ct. App. 1987); see also
Business Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 40 S.C.L. REv. 22 (1988).
43. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text.
44. See Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 475 (E.D.
La. 1986); Rosa v. Johnson, 3 Haw. App. 420, 651 P.2d 1228 (1982); Eastlake Constr. Co.
v. Hess, 102 Wash. 2d 30, 686 P.2d 465 (1984).
45. 181 Ga. App. 483, 352 S.E.2d 806 (1987).
46. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-390 to -407 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
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is present, either against multiple consumers or against an individual. For individuals to have standing to bring a claim, they
must be a member of the consuming public, suffer damage as
the result of an unfair or deceptive act or practice, and, further,
the
the act or practice must have a potentially harmful effect 4on
7
general consuming public or a significant portion thereof.
IV.

ARBITRATOR'S POWER TO AWARD UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE'
STATUTORY REMEDIES

SCUTPA and NCUTPA offer the additional remedies of
treble damages and the possibility of attorneys' fees. Some argue
that arbitrators also may award treble damages. The counterargument is that punitive damages are a sanction that should be
reserved for the state. New York courts have taken the latter
position.4 8 In Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. 49 the court reasoned
that to give arbitrators such power would risk abuse of an arbitrators' discretion. The more popular view, however, is that
when a legislature passes an arbitration act, it is expressing a
strong state policy in favor of arbitration that should be limited
only by other statutes.5 0 Disputes about arbitrators' power to
award attorneys' fees are less frequent. Both the North and
South Carolina arbitration statutes include the same provision:
"Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the
arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award." 51
52
In G.L. Wilson Building Co. v. Thorneburg Hosiery Co.
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that counsel fees are
not a subject of arbitration under NCUTPA 3 In Thorneburg
Hosiery the contract provided that "[t]he Owner will pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Contractor for the collec-

47. See 181 Ga. App. at 484, 352 S.E.2d at 808.
48. See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386
N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
49. 40 N.Y.2d 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1976).
50. See Arbitration, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 64 N.C.L.
REv. 1145 (1986).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.11 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-110 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988).
52. 85 N.C. App. 684, 355 S.E.2d 815 (1987).
53. See id. at 689-90, 355 S.E.2d at 819.
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tion of any defaulted payment due to the Contractor by the
owner as a result of this contract.

5

4

The court, reviewing the

arbitration award, agreed that this contract clause was enforceable in court, but held that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by awarding attorneys' fees. Thus, a separate action in court
55
would be necessary to recover attorneys' fees.
North Carolina, and possibly South Carolina, courts may
take the opposite position on the issue of the arbitrability of a
claim for treble damages. Of course, the contract between the
parties must provide for the arbitration of such disputes. An "all
disputes" clause 51 will indicate that the contract provides for the
arbitration of unfair trade practices claims. If a contract contains this provision, the issue becomes the scope of the arbitrator's authority to award damages. Neither the North Carolina
nor the South Carolina arbitration statutes expressly provide for
or prohibit the award of treble damages.5 7 Thus, courts must
weigh the policy in favor of arbitration against the policy of allowing only the courts to impose civil sanctions for undesirable
behavior.
In Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen"5 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals decided in favor of expanding the powers of
the arbitrators.5 9 In McQueen the contractor made a demand for
arbitration and sought payments due from the owner. The arbitrator awarded contractual damages to the contractor, who then
sought treble damages for unfair and deceptive trade practices
in a separate trial. The McQueen court held that the unfair
trade practices claim was arbitrable and that the arbitrator had
the authority to award treble damages. Since the contractor
could have pursued this claim in arbitration, the later unfair
trade practices lawsuit was precluded by res judicata6 0

54. Id. at 687, 355 S.E.2d at 817.
55. See id. at 689-90, 355 S.E.2d at 819.
56. A typical "all disputes clause" was quoted in Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueens, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985): "All claims, disputes and other matters
in question between the Contractor and the Owner arising out of, or relating to, the
Contract Documents or breach thereof, ..

shall be decided by arbitration. .

.

... Id. at

18, 331 S.E.2d at 728.
57. See N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 1-567.11 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-110 (Law. Co-op.

Supp. 1988).
58. 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
59. See id. at 29, 331 S.E.2d at 734.
60. See id. at 30, 331 S.E.2d at 735.
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South Carolina courts have not faced this issue. Nevertheless, because South Carolina and North Carolina arbitration
statutes are so similar, South Carolina courts also might permit
arbitrators to award treble damages. Thus, in both South Carolina and North Carolina, the recovery of attorneys' fees likely is
unavailable in arbitration, but treble damages may be recoverable under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the proper factual scenario, SCUTPA and NCUTPA add
two more arrows to the sling of claims that litigants in a construction dispute might allege. Practitioners, therefore, should
advise their clients that an award of treble damages and attorneys' fees is a real possibility should a court uphold an unfair
trade practices claim. Further, recovery of a treble damages
award in arbitration is available in North Carolina and probably
South Carolina, as well.
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